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The Coast Guard's planning system is in need of
improvement. Questions remain, however, about how much and
in what areas the changes need to be made to effect the
improvements
.
The study uses the Coast Guard's Office of Command,
Control and Communications (G-T) as an example for
improving the overall Coast Guard planning system. It
describes the current planning system and identifies its
successes and problems. A method for formally analyzing
the quality and effectiveness of the planning system is
illustrated through the use of Tichy's model for strategic
change management. Recommendations for changes to the
strategic planning system are derived from the analysis of
G-T.
The study shows the strategic planning system in G-T is
in need of improvement. The current system has some
advantages, but its problems make the system less effective
than it should be. Further, the Tichy model provides a
comprehensive insight into planning problems and makes
possible the identification of solutions to improve the
planning system. It is recommended that managers in G-T
become familiar with the Tichy model for future use in
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In 1990 the United States Coast Guard celebrates its
two hundredth birthday. Over of the past two hundred years
the service has grown in size and responsibility while
being given less resources to perform its additional
missions. How does the service survive in the today's
turbulent environment under these conditions?
Sound strategic planning is one of the areas of
management that can ensure the long term survival of an
organization [Ref. 1]. If an organization is doing the
right things its products will be in demand and the
organization will be supported. What is the state of the
Coast Guard's strategic planning system?
This thesis studies the Office of Command, Control and
Communications (G-T) to gain an insight into how the Coast
Guard actually does its planning. Like the rest of the
Coast Guard, G-T has had many successes and failures since
its creation in 1981. Its effectiveness throughout the
period has been questioned by many, including the top G-T
managers. As a result, the Office has re-evaluated its own
capabilities and reorganized itself four times in the last
seven years. It is still reorganizing today.
This research project has helped reinforce the author's
learning experience at the Naval Postgraduate School. It
is hoped that some of the analyses and recommendations
contained in this thesis may provide G-T and the Coast
Guard with a new way of evaluating its strategic planning




The research question this study will attempt to answer
is as follows:
Is it possible to improve Coast Guard planning and, if
so, how?
A study of the entire Coast Guard planning system would
require more time and resources than are available.
However, a unit responsible for planning and management of
a Coast Guard program can provide insight into how the
service as a whole plans.
The Coast Guard Office of Command, Control and
Communications (G-T) was chosen as a representative unit of
the Coast Guard to serve as a sample of Coast Guard planning
for the study. It is located in Coast Guard Headquarters
and performs all planning functions for the Command, Control
3
and Communications (C ) program in the service. Further, G-
T requires a well developed planning system due to its
turbulent environment.
To break down the main research question into manageable
parts, four sub-questions have been formulated:
1) How does G-T currently do its planning?




What processes or procedures might be used to
formally assess the quality of an organization's
planning system?
4) What kind of changes in management/organization might
be recommended to improve the existing planning
system in G-T?
These four questions provide the framework for the study.
First, the G-T planning system will be described. Coast
Guard Headquarters (CGHQ) has a planning system that is used
by each office that manages a Coast Guard program. G-T
serves as a good representation of how planning is done in
other offices at CGHQ.
Secondly, the successes resulting from the good planning
efforts in G-T, as well as the problems will be presented.
These successes and problems were identified through
informal interviews conducted with G-T personnel and studies
conducted in G-T during the past four years.
Thirdly, Noel Tichy's model for strategic change
management will be demonstrated as a formal way to assess or
evaluate an organization's planning system. This model is
used to analyze the organization and management processes
that ensure G-T's strategic alignment with its environment.
The assumption is, if the organization can reorient itself
to technical, political or cultural change, the planning
system is sound. [Ref. 2]
Finally, the study will make recommendations, based on
the analysis, for G-T to improve its planning system. It is
assumed that most of the recommendations will be applicable
to the rest of the Coast Guard, as well.
B. METHODOLOGY OF THE STDDY
The study follows the scientific method of problem
solving
:
1) State the purpose of the study.
2) Review the literature and collect data about the
organization relating to the purpose.
3) Present the facts of the case and identify the
problems
.
4) Analyze the facts and present alternatives to the
problems
5) Offer recommendations for change.
A summary of the methodology used in each part of the study
is presented in this section.
1
. Purpose/Research Question
The study questions were based on the author's
interests, future career path and perceived Coast Guard
needs. Strategic planning is an important topic in today's
ever-changing world and this study has given the author an
opportunity to explore this topic. Further, the author's
future career path in communications management made it
3practical to explore the Coast Guard's C management
techniques
.
2. Literature Review and Data Collection
The literature review was conducted onboard the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Most of the
initial review was directed towards the subject of
strategic planning.
Collection of data consisted of interviews of
personnel in the Coast Guard Office of Command, Control and
Communications (G-T) and collection of various documents
and studies during the interview period in Washington D.C.
The interviews were conducted in March 1988
during a trip by the author to G-T. The interviews were
concentrated in the Strategic Planning Branch of the Plans
and Policy Division of the office. However, interviews
were also conducted in other divisions of the office and at
all levels of the G-T organization. Unfortunately, access
to the top managers of the organization was limited due to
time constrains.
During the interview process two studies
commissioned by G-T top managers were discovered. These
studies were:
1) The Culbertson Study--This study was commissioned by
the Chief of the Office of Command, Control and
Communications in 1984. The study chairman, Coast
Guard Captain James F. Culbertson, was tasked with
examining the role and effectiveness of the office
and identifying successes and major problems areas
within the organization, both at Headquarters and in
the field. He was to highlight the specific issues
underlying the problems identified and propose
solutions leading to their elimination; [Ref. 3:
Encl 1] and
2) The Critical Success Factor Study—Commissioned in
1987 by the Chief of the Office of Command, Control
and Communications, this study was conducted by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation
Systems Center and Index Group, Inc., a commercial
consulting group. The study was implemented to
clarify the steps required to produce a system for
management of on-going and future activities. The
study involved participation of all management levels
in the office. [Ref. 4]
Because the study groups had more time and access to more
people in the organization, their collection of data was
more complete. Data quoted from the studies have been used
to fill the information gaps missed in the author's
interviews
.
3 . Facts And Problems
The facts extracted from the data collected above
are presented as a case study. The case is intended to
answer sub-questions one and two and is presented in two
parts
:
1) The organizational structure and planning processes;
and
2) The organization's successes and current problems.
The case study provides the background information about
the Coast Guard and G-T collected during the interviews,
from G-T studies and from office documents. This




Noel Tichy's Model for Strategic Change Management
was chosen to be used in illustrating how G-T can formally
assess its planning system. The model is taken from Tichy's
book, Managing Strategic Change. The analysis of G-T is
performed using the concepts and procedures developed in
this book. Alternative solutions to problems are given
throughout the analysis.
5 Recommendations And Conclusions
The recommendations for improvement of the
organization's processes and planning practices are based on
Tichy's model. The recommendations given are the
implementable solutions to problems. Conclusions about the
Coast Guard and G-T planning systems are drawn from the
study
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is organized consistent with the parts of the
study discussed above. A brief overview of the thesis
organization follows.
Chapters II, III and IV constitute the case study of the
G-T organization. Chapter II describes the Coast Guard's
mission and organization, G-T ' s mission and formal and
informal structure. Chapter III describes G-T's planning
system. Chapter IV discusses the successes of the
organization, since its creation in 1981, as well as the
problems with the planning system identified during the
research phase.
Chapter V gives a brief explanation of how Noel Tichy's
Model for Strategic Change Management is used in the study
to assess the quality of G-T's planning system. The
evaluation technique is demonstrated using the information
gathered about G-T during the research phase of the study.
A discussion of how it will be used in the analysis of the
G-T organization follows the explanation.
Chapter VI gives recommendations for organizational
change to help G-T reorient itself to its environment. The
recommended adjustments will presumably improve the
organization's planning system, putting G-T in closer touch
with its environment. The recommendations are based on the
analysis in Chapter IV.
Finally, Chapter VII makes conclusions about the study
and the possible implications of techniques derived herein.
II. THE OFFICE OF COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMON ICATIONS
This chapter presents the purpose and structure in
which the Office of Command, Control and Communications (G-
T) operates. It discusses the creation and structural
evolution of the office, as well as some of its processes.
The information in this chapter will provide the background
necessary to follow the analysis of the organization later
in the thesis.
G-T is a functional unit of the Coast Guard
Headquarters Staff. It is a Support Program which controls
resources at every level of the Coast Guard organization.
In order to appreciate the functions and responsibilities
of G-T, the environmental context in which the organization
operates must be understood.
A. THE U.S. COAST GUARD
The U.S. Coast Guard was created in 1790 by President
George Washington to enforce customs laws in the navigable
waters of the United States. Since that time, the service
has undergone tremendous growth, taking on additional law
enforcement, maritime safety and defense missions.
The organization is made up of 40,000 people with an
annual budget of approximately two billion dollars. Given
the Coast Guard's missions and the service it provides to
the public, the Coast Guard is one of the best values to the
American taxpayer. Dol lar-for-dol lar the Coast Guard
returns as much benefit to the public as any other federal
agency and far more than is appropriated to the service.
To maintain this high level of performance in a budget
cutting environment the Coast Guard reorganized support
functions in 1986. The intent was to eliminate overhead,
concentrating on operation and the deliverables to the
public. A discussion of the Coast Guard's missions and
present organization follows.
1 . Missions
The Coast Guard's missions can be divided into three
functional areas: maritime law enforcement, maritime safety
and national defense.
Maritime law enforcement is the Coast Guard's oldest
and most important mission. It was established as a mission
in 1790 with the creation of the Revenue Cutter Service, the
Coast Guard's predecessor. The original statutory mandate,
enforcement of customs laws, is still the Coast Guard's
major authority for law enforcement operations. Law
enforcement responsibilities range from drug interdiction to
immigration laws to treasury laws. The Coast Guard is the
federal law enforcement arm on the high seas and in U.S.
territorial waters.
Maritime safety is the most publicized mission of
the Coast Guard. Search and Rescue is the service's most
10
successful and rewarding mission. Other areas of maritime
safety, however, are just as important. Aids to navigation,
marine vessel inspection, port safety and pollution response
are all statutory assignments to the Coast Guard.
National defense is the third mission area the Coast
Guard is involved in. The Coast Guard works closely with
the Navy in times of war and is assigned coastal defense
responsibilities. Coast Guard ships regularly participate
in Navy exercises and training programs. The Coast Guard is
an Armed Force of the U.S. and participates in the defense
on the country.
As a support function, G-T is tasked with developing
3Command, Control and Communications (C ) systems for the
diverse missions of the service. It is apparent that the
Coast Guard is a multi-missioned service, working with a
3
variety of federal, state and local agencies. Developing C
systems that are interoperable with these agencies is a
formidable task.
2 . Organization
The Coast Guard is organized hierarchically by
geographic location. As shown in Figure 2.1 the Coast Guard
is divided into two Areas Commands: Pacific and Atlantic.
Area Commanders, located on Governor's Island, NY and at
Alameda, CA, are in charge of carrying out the missions
specified above within their areas. To aid the Area
11
Commanders in managing their large Areas, Districts were
formed. I Ref . 5]
Coast Guard Districts
Pacific Area I Atlantic Area
Figure 2.1: Coast Guard Geographical Distribution
The Atlantic Area has six Districts and the Pacific
has four. The District Office, headed by a two-star admiral
is the hub of operations within its geographic area. The
Area Commanders have jurisdiction over operations that cross
these District boundries. As seen in Figure 2.2, there is a
12
Maintenance and Logisitics Command located in each Area to
provide support to all the Districts and operational forces.
[Ref. 6]
Commandant
Commander, Atlantic Area Commander, Pacific Area
Commander, Maintenance
and Logistics Command Atlantic
Commander, Maintenance











Figure 2.2: Coast Guard Organization Chart
G-T's interests are concentrated in the Area and
J
District Command Centers which provide the Commanders C-3
3
support of their forces in the field. It is at these C
centers that the products of G-T meet the customers, the
operational or field units.
B. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION
Figure 2.3 shows the command structure of Coast Guard
Headquarters ( CGHQ ) . The offices of Operations, Marine
Safety and Navigation manage Operating Programs because
they provide direct service to the public. The other
13
offices manage Support Programs. Support Programs, such as
the ones G-T manages, provide services to the Operating





















Figure 2.3: Coast Guard Headquarters Organization Chart
C. HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF C 3 (G-T)
This section discusses the creation and early evolution
of the Office of Command, Control and Communications (G-T).
Most of the historical data in this section was obtained
from a Reorganization Request G-T submitted to the CGHQ
Chief of Staff in January of 1986. [Ref. 7]
1. Concept of the Office
G-T was established in May of 1981. The office was
established to focus attention on Coast Guard Information
14
Resources Management (IRM) and Command, Control and
Communications (C ) as special areas of management emphasis.
The Coast Guard made the investment in organization,
personnel and money through the establishment of the T
organization. By focusing on C 3 /irm, Coast Guard leaders
expected to gain significant improvements in overall mission
effectiveness and efficiency.
At the headquarters level, the G-T organizational
structure reflected an integrated approach to information
resource management (IRM) primarily by mixing the previously
independent specialties and responsibilities of electronics
engineering, telecommunications, and automated data
processing (ADP). The move was consistent with current IRM
3
and C approaches in both industry and government, including
DOD. It was intended to move the Coast Guard more
aggressively into the information technology field. The
thrust of G-T's mission was to identify and provide
telecommunications and ADP resources required to support the
Coast Guard's operational and support functions.
2. Original Organization
The Office of Command, Control and Communications
was established in two phases. Initially, the staffs from
the:
1) Electronics Engineering (G-EEE);
2) Telecommunications Management (G-OTM) ; and
3) Information Systems (G-FIS) Divisions
15
were transferred essentially intact from their traditional
offices as shown in Figure 2.4. Also transferred to G-T
were the Coast Guard Command Center staffs from:
1) Flag Plot (G-OFP or the Coast Guard Operations
Center ) ; and the














Figure 2.4: Coast Guard Headquarters Pre-T Organization
A year later, after studying the best way to
coordinate these individual groups, the second phase of the
reorganization occurred. Figure 2.5 shows the newly
synthesized G-T organizational structure.
First, two Systems Divisions were created:
1) Data Systems Division (G-TDS); and
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Then, a Plans and Policy Division (G-TPP) was created.
Finally, Flag Plot, the National Response Center and the
Telecommunications Center were combined into the Coast
Guard Headquarters Command Center (G-TGC).
The telecommunications functions were split up
between G-TES, G-TPP, and G-TGC. Area Office were expected
to pick-up management of the "operational
telecommunications" .
D. SETTLING ON AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
This section explains the development of G-T's present
organizational structure. Again, the information
reconstructing the facts of the reorganization effort were
extracted from the Reorganization Request. [Ref . 7]
1 . Problems With The Original Structure
In 1986 G-T again evaluated its organizational
structure and effectiveness. It was found that the
structure which the office operated under for its first five
years was far superior to the traditional orientation of
spreading the electronics, telecommunications, and ADP
functions over three offices. The new structure integrated
the Coast Guard's approach to management of information
resources and evaluation of emerging technologies. For
example, the success of the standard terminal can be
attributed to the synergy created in this organization. The
Coast Guard Standard Terminal, which will be discussed in
18
detail later, was considered a major leap forward into the
world of office automation and computer literacy for the
Coast Guard. Internal studies, however, identified several
problems that were hampering an otherwise good concept of
managing T programs.
First, there was no longer a focus on
telecommunications due to the dismantling and distribution
of these functions (previously held by G-OTM) . The Coast
Guard was faced with new problems like Federal Telephone
Service ( FTS ) cost containment, network interaction and the
AT&T divestiture. A coordinated telecommunications focus
was needed at this point to grapple effectively with these
problems
.
Secondly, the Plans and Policy Division (G-TPP) was
seen as having too large a span of control . Because the
original people that staffed G-TPP were so powerful, they
were able to gain control of a lot of strategic functions in
G-T . As a result G-TPP had accumulated important divisional
duties and office staff functions.
G-TPP 1 s divisional duties pertained mainly to
allocations of the current year's budget and managing T
resources. It's staff duties were human resource planning
and executing G-T's Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System ( PPBS ) responsibilities. These functions were too
much for one division to manage effectively. Consequently,
19
G-TPP typically short changed the long-range strategic plans
in order to accomplish near term plans.
Thirdly, other T divisions lacked the resources for
product-line planning. Although G-TPP was tasked with this
activity, it was felt that the other divisions should have
this capability in-house because it dealt directly with
their products.
2. The Present Organizational Structure
The solution to these problems was to:
1) create a Telecommunications Systems Division to
handle telecommunications problems; and
2) reallocate office functions and responsibilities to
gain a more equitable distribution of power.
The reorganization of G-T divisional responsibilities in
1986 resulted in the present G-T structure (shown in Figure
2.6). The following is a breakdown of G-T's organization:
a. Office Staff
Consists of the office chief, his deputy,
technical advisor and clerical staff. The staff was
deliberately kept small to reduce the administrative tasks
for top level managers. Divisions have been delegated
sufficient authority and responsibility to execute their
programs within the constraints of broad policy guidance.
b. Plans And Policy Division (G-TPP)
Responsible for managing all G-T resources









































































































planning, programming and budgeting ( PPBS ) activities and
is responsible for strategic planning in the office.
c. Information Systems Division (G-TIS)
Responsible for all major field computer systems
and associated software. This includes the development of
service-wide standards for operation and security of ADP
systems, as well as support for the Coast Guard Standard
Terminal. It oversees the daily operations of the
Transportation Computer Center (a DOT resource).
d. Telecommunications Systems Division (G-TTS)
Responsible for managing the Coast Guard
Telecommunications System ( CGTS ) . This includes landlines,
radio communications, radio frequency management, AUTODIN,
secure communications, etc. It also manages the Coast
Guard's TEMPEST program (secure communications equipment)
and coordinates the distribution of classified key
materials in the Coast Guard.
e. Electronics Systems Division (G-TES)
Responsible for the management, acquisition and
support of all Coast Guard electronics equipment. It works
closely to the Electronics Engineering Center and Lab,
Command and Control ( COMDAC ) Support Facility, districts,
and all program managers on electronic issues. This
division manages all electronics related project resources.
??
f. Headquarters Command Center (G-TGC)
Responsible for the operational and support
functions of Flag Plot, the National Response Center and
the Telecommunications Center. This Command Center is
manned 24-hours per day and is not considered part of the
daily management of the T program.
3. G-T Councils
Thus far the G-T organization has been described as
being only functional in construction. However, three
councils have been recently established to help integrate
issues that cross divisional lines. The councils have been
formed at the top, middle and bottom levels of the
organization as shown in Figure 2.7. They were established
to foster better communications between divisions, address
interdivisional planning issues and define project
management requirements which transcend divisions.
The councils are defined as follows:
1) Board of Directors ( BOD ) --Consists of office staff
and all division chiefs. Responsible for the overall
strategic decision making in G-T.
2) Deputy Division Chiefs Council ( DDCC ) --Consists of
all assistant division chiefs in G-T. Responsible
for improving communications between divisions and
addressing issues whose scope crosses division
boundries
.
3) Planning Council—Consists of a planning officer from
each division. Chaired by a member of the DDCC, it
is tasked by and reports to the DDCC. It is
responsible for formulation and review of all G-T
planning documents, coordination of projects crossing
division lines and proposing annual goals and








These councils have been in effect only a short
time; therefore, their impact on the organization's
management process has not been determined. Presently, they




III. THE G-T PLANNING SYSTEM
The G-T planning system is described in this chapter.
The methods and procedures used to formulate the strategic
plan and the planning documents will be presented.
Further, the link between the strategic planning system,
the budget and the budget execution will be discussed.
A. THE COMMANDANT'S LONG RANGE VIEW
Figure 3.1 depicts the planning process in Coast Guard
Headquarters. It begins with the Commandant and his staff
assessing and evaluating the scenario or setting in which
the Coast Guard will be operating during the next 15 years.
He evaluates challenges that are operational, administrative
or budgetary in nature and will have a significant impact on
the way the Coast Guard will have to do business in the
future. [Ref. 8]
Upon completing this evaluation the Commandant issues
the Commandant's Long Range View. The document, issued
biannually, is divided into two parts:
1) Overview--Brief ly describes the scenario in the next
15 years and sets forth The Commandant's direction
for addressing it.
2) Policy Guidance--Discusses specific issues and policy
provided to serve as a focal point for use in
developing plans in the service.
26
The Commandant's Long Range View serves as a basis for the


















Figure 3.1: Coast Guard Headquarters Planning Process
B. THE OPERATING AND SDPPORT PROGRAM PLANS
G-T is considered to be a Support Program, that is, a
program that serves other Coast Guard programs. In
contrast, Operating Programs directly serve the public (e.g.
Search and Rescue or Law Enforcement).
Support Program Directors provide support or logistic
capacity, subject to the needs and requirements of the
27
Operating Programs Directors. The Operating Program
Directors must make sure the needs of their program are made
know to the Support Program Directors who provide support to
their program. A common source of this information is the
Operating Program Plan (OPP). Using the OPPs in conjunction
with the Commandant's Long Range View (CLRV), Support
Program Directors can develop the Support Program Plan
(SPP)
.
Both the OPP and the SPP translate the forecasts and
guidance from the Commandant's Long Range View (CLRV) into
five year plans. The Program Directors use these plans to
direct the course of their programs and set mid-range budget
priorities. These plans, issued annually, must be
consistent with the CLRV. They describe the intent of the
Program, why it should be done, how and when it will be
done, the outputs to be delivered and the analysis of the
preferred and other alternatives for accomplishment of the
Program's goals. [Ref. 9]
The SPP in G-T is developed by the Strategic Planning
Branch of G-TPP. The project is assigned to an 0-3 or 0-4
grade officer or equivalent civilian. The officer assigned
to the development of the plan reviews the previous year's
plan making minor modifications to come up with the new SPP.
Very little interaction with the Operating Program Directors
occurs. Therefore, the plan doesn't change much from year.
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It does, however, reflect the current state of projects for
future years developed in other G-T divisions.
The SPP is reviewed and revised as it travels up the
chain-of-command. These minor modifications are finalized
in the the SPP and the document is signed by the office
chief. It is then put on the shelf until the next year when
it is revised again.
C. THE LINK TO THE PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PROCESS
Figure 3.2 shows how the SPP supposedly links the
















Figure 3.2: The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
be used to develop the Issues document, the initial
document of the programming and budgeting phase. The
Issues document is a one to two page document prepared by
G-T for the Chief of Staff. The document, which should
focus on G-T's potential requirements discussed and
approved as part of the SPP, is divided into two parts:
29
those Issues which require budgetary resources and those
that require policy decisions.
During the Issues phase the Operating and Support
Program Directors meet one-on-one with the Chief of Staff to
reach an understanding on each program's goals and
objectives requiring emphasis in the upcoming budget cycle.
Note that these are one-on-one meetings with the Chief of
Staff. The Chief of Staff must, therefore, have a deep
understanding about the direction the Commandant wants to
lead the service. He must also be familiar with the
capabilities of all the Operating and Support Programs.
[Ref. 10]
After each program director meets with the Chief of
Staff, the Issues are reviewed by the Chief of Staff's
programming staff for budget and policy impact. They are
then reassembled to serve as basis for Determinations
provided by the Commandant. Determinations will incorporate
Commandant decisions on program direction and will identify
solutions to problems that require further quantitative
development. [Ref. 10]
Upon issuing Determinations, the process of developing
the Program Budget is started. The Resource Allocation
Branch of G-TPP develops the Resource Prospectus (RP), a one
page summary of each problem identified in the Issues phase,
the possible solutions, including the preferred solution and
the impact of denial. The Resource Prospectus is then
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reviewed by the Chief of Staff who prioritizes the proposed
project plans in order of their importance in meeting the
goals and objectives of the Coast Guard. [Ref. 10]
Resource Change Proposals (RCP) are the final budget
documents prepared by the Resource Allocation Branch of G-
TPP. Division personnel responsible for projects relating
to the problem solutions input the information necessary to
arrive at detailed cost analysis, and quantification of
benefits. The RCPs then serve as basis for the G-T budget.
[Ref. 10]
The programming and budgeting process is designed to be
highly dependent on the planning done in developing the SPP.
Although the Strategic Planning Branch invests a lot of time
and effort in developing the SPP, without direct interaction
with top level managers from G-T and the Operating Programs,
the document doesn't carry the impact it should. Because
the quality of the SPP in G-T is suspect, G-T has,
traditionally, used very little of the SPP to develop their
budget documents. The SPP serves no useful purpose to G-T
except to fulfill a Chief of Staff annual requirement.
D. PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS
G-T is not alone in its difficulty with the SPP. Many
other Program Directors throughout headquarters have
complained to the Chief of Staff about the workload and
total volume of paper resulting from the current OPP/SPP
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system. Further, they feel that the OPP/SPPs are simply not
designed to provide the link to the programming and
budgeting system they should.
A major movement is presently underway to change the
planning system at headquarters by the Chief of Staff's
Plans Evaluation Division. Program Descriptions are to take
the place of the current OPP/SPPs. The Program Descriptions
are defined as tools used to describe and analyze a
program's goals and activities, their implementation and
their accomplishments. It is intended to be used as a basis
for discussion at Issues.
Before Issues are discussed between the Program
Directors and the Chief of Staff, each program must make an
in-depth review of the current program status and the
approaching trends that may cause change. This process is
designed to force the link between the planning and
programming phases of the PPBS cycle. Because the system is
new and untested, this thesis will not address the
management implications of this system. [Ref. 11]
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TV. SDCCESSES AND CDRRENT PROBLEMS
This chapter will examine some of the past successes
and current problems in the Office of Command, Control and
Communications (G-T). These successes and problems are a
direct result of G-T's planning system.
A. SDCCESSES
The G-T organization was created in 1981 during a very
volatile and uncertain time in the information revolution.
Office automation and advances in electronics overwhelmed
the Coast Guard before G-T was formed. In the short time
since its creation, however, G-T has chalked-up some
impressive successes. This section looks at a few of these.
1 . The Coast Guard Standard Terminal
Office automation has been a high priority on G-T's
agenda since the creation of the office. In the late 1970's
technology moved from centralized mainframes and
minicomputers for office automation to distributed personal
micro-computers. Apple and IBM were the industry leaders in
microcomputer sales during this revolution. Coast Guard
shore and shipboard offices began purchasing office
automation equipment from these and other companies during
the late '70s with little regard for the long term costs of
software support and equipment maintenance. The result was
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ad hoc purchases of incompatible computer systems and
services. G-T saw the need to standardize these purchases
to realize the economies of scale that standardization
al lows
.
One of the first actions by G-T was to halt the ad
hoc purchase practice of Automated Data Processing (ADP)
equipment. They formed local review boards at the district
office level called Information Resource Aquisition Boards
(IRAB). The boards were to monitor the purchase of ADP
equipment ensuring standardization of equipment and services
within individual headquarters and district units. This
ensured that some economies were realized at the district
and headquarters level; however, G-T wasn't satisfied with
the result.
G-T began to developed specifications for purchasing
of a state-of-the-art microcomputer to be named the Coast
Guard Standard Terminal. The standard terminal was to be
purchased for distribution throughout the entire Coast
Guard. Hardware, software and maintenance equipment and
services were to be provided by one source, thus maximizing
economies of scale and providing a standard throughout the
service
.
The specifications for the computer were far
advanced from the products IBM and Apple were providing at
the time. For instance, multi-server operations in
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clustered workstations were specified. This capability has
only recently been developed and marketed by IBM and Apple.
Moreover, the software for word and spreadsheet
processing, along with software development packages was
required to be standard on each machine. The computer
purchase was intended to help automate the Coast Guard and
give the service the ability to share data between many
users with the help of its highly developed communications
package
.
G-T was very successful in the automation effort.
There is no place in the Coast Guard one can go where these
terminals aren't the center of operations. One major
advantage to this is that wherever an individual is
transfered, he is already trained on the office automation
equipment. Standardization is often rigid and slow,
however, G-T has issured that the system possesses maximum
flexibility. This can be proven by the diverse types of
users the computer supports today.
Equally responsible for the success of the standard
terminal are the wide in-house support services G-T has
developed. A Systems Maintenance and Engineering Facility
( SMEF ) was established to develop software applications in
the Coast Guard, as well as act as final acceptance officer
for software releases. Information Centers act as customer
representatives for computer problems. These centers give
advice and support to standard terminal users throughout the
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service. Numerous bulletin boards exist to help the user
through the myriad of applications and difficulties
automation has brought to the Coast Guard.
This has been one of the most challenging and far
reaching projects ever given to a Coast Guard Headquarters
office. It has also been one of the most successful. It
brings the Coast Guard into the 1980' s in an equal or better
position in automation than most other government agencies,
including DOD
.
2. Interoperability With The Navy
In 1980 the Navy and Coast Guard formed the NAVGUARD
Board to look into ways the Coast Guard could be used to
help the Navy Reserve in the coastal defense mission of the
United States. The Coast Guard and Navy started a new era
of cooperation with the formation of Maritime Defense Zones
in 1982. Implementing this concept required the Coast Guard
to have a high degree of interoperability with the Navy. G-
T has taken a big part in this effort ensuring Coast Guard
C~ systems not only meet unique Coast Guard requirements,
but also promote interoperability with the Navy.
G-T now works closely with the Navy's SPAWAR Command
reviewing interoperability questions. Procedures for
operations and equipment requirements are now coordinated
through a Coast Guard liaison officer stationed in SPAWAR.
This operation has been highly successful in getting Coast
Guard equipment requirements funded by DOD and the Navy.
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The funding has been extremely important in the recent
budget-cutting environment.
The cooperation with the Navy may have also had an
indirect effect on the Coast Guard's ability to get money
from Congress. The competencies required in working with
Congress have never been a strong point in the service.
Having an opportunity to learn these skills from a
successful agency in this regard has strengthened the Coast
Guard's ability to work within the Congressional budget
authorization and appropriation system.
3 . Career Development
The early years of G-T were exciting and challenging
to T specialists. They were also very career damaging. The
Culbertson study noted:
T officer specialists are faced with continuing
dilemmas in career planning and promotabil ity . They may
stay in speciality assignments too long or cannot compete
effectively with peers for rotational tours. Without
"blue-suit" credentials, they risk being passed-over.
[Ref. 3: p 35]
Indeed, a higher percentage of T officers have been passed
over in past years than the Coast Guard average. Out-of-
speciality tours have been rare due to the shortage of T
specialists coupled with the pressing needs of the service
in the T area.
A couple of years ago a campaign was started to
increase the attractiveness of the T speciality, along with
the retention and promotabil ity of T officers. In 1987 the
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T program selection rate was 76-percent which is competitive
with the main stream of the Coast Guard. The promotion rate
was a significant improvement over past years' results [Ref.
121. Tt has also encouraged officers, previously having
reservations about a career in the T speciality, to join the
program.
Other successes have been achieved in the area of
rotational tours given to T specialists. Today, the T
program is nearly adequately staffed and can afford to let
officers "punch the blue-suit ticket." Only recently has
the T leadership emphasized maintenance of operational
leadership and management abilities, as well as technical
expertise. No longer do T officers find themselves staying
in the speciality against their will. This is a big change
in attitude from years past and it seems to be paying the
program dividends.
B. CDRRENT PROBLEMS
Despite the successes of the G-T organization, severe
leadership and management problems have been identified in
the interviews and studies. These problems have a direct
effect on G-T's ability to plan in its environment.
Some of these problems can be attributed to the fact
that G-T is relatively new and hasn't gone through enough
iterations of structure and policy to eliminate them. This
section will explore the structure, communication,
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credibility, overtasking and planning system problems
identified in the research.
1. Organizational Structure
The Culbertson Study noted that:
the G-T organization is confusing to people in the field
and to many people at Headquarters, even within the G-T
organization. [Ref. 3: p 18]
Most of the confusion stemmed from the position that the
Planning and Programming Branch (G-TPP) held within the
office. G-TPP was and still is a division with staff
responsibilities. The human resources and budget planning
and allocation functions are unmistakably office level
responsibilities, since they cross all division and span
all levels of the organization.
Early on, G-TPP was headed up by a group of very
powerful individuals. G-TPP was able to take on the office
level functions at the division level because of the
personal power of its leadership, coupled with its support
from top management. G-TPP integrated all the plans of the
divisions and divided-up the projects to the divisions.
Culbertson noted that G-TPP was too involved in the
implementation of the projects as well. G-TPP not only
planned the work, but apparently followed-up on projects
very closely. [Ref. 3: p 18-19]
The way G-TPP conducted project planning and
implementation fostered poor relations between the divisions
and G-TPP. When the powerful individuals left the
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organization, new, less powerful and less knowledgeable
people took their places. It was then that the divisions
seized the opportunity to gain more autonomy over their own
operations
.
The division chiefs cooperated less with G-TPP, only
to the extent of getting project funding. They began
cutting off information flows to G-TPP. Starting as a
reaction to the dictatorial manner in which the original
members of G-TPP managed projects, all the divisions
contributed in eliminating the integrating force G-TPP
provided the organization. G-TPP was powerless to do
anything about the situation because there was no formal
organizational structure to prevent the other divisions from
circumventing G-TPP' s authority.
The functional organization of G-T can be related
back to pre-T days. Electronics (G-EEE), telecommunications
(G-OTM) and data processing (G-FDS) had, historically, been
separate. It is the perception of many in the office of T
that they still operate that way today. One G-T officer
commented that the only thing the T organization did was
bring the three functional disciplines together on the same
floor of the building, but it did nothing for having them
work together. This functional structure gave rise to many
communications problems. These problems will be addressed
in the next section.
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Turf battles often arise within this functional
organization. Fighting for resources and project money is
an everyday occurrence in G-T. Without control of resources
and projects, divisions cannot implement their parochial
interests
.
2 . Coimnunicat ions
Lack of communications within the office of T,
within Headquarters and with field commands seriously
detracts from the program's performance. During the
interviews this problem was the most frequently articulated.
Further, both the Culbertson and Critical Success Factor
studies listed lack of communications as a major obstacle to
achieving the optimal program performance.
Culbertson found that the communication problem was
a subset of the larger problem of developing a corporate T
culture. It stated:
This is actually a subset of the more general problem
resulting from a lack of awareness as to just what the T-
organization is, what its goals are, how it fits into the
overall Coast Guard organization and what it should be
doing vice what it actually is doing. [Ref. 3: p 6]
In other words, top management doesn't articulate the
purpose and mission of the organization very effectively.
Another important problem is the lack of
communications across divisional lines. The Critical
Success Factor study found that the interdivisional lines of
communications were "limited and in some cases non-
existent." Members of divisions know little about what is
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going on in T, outside of their own area of expertise [Ref.
4]. Given these facts, it is easy to imagine how the lack
of communication and cooperation between divisions can lead
to some duplication of project efforts. It has been found
in the past that two separate divisions have been working on
the same project without the other division's knowledge.
Duplication of effort is both wasteful and counter-
productive .
Moreover, the communication problem has severely
limited management and coordination of projects. With many
3of today's C projects requiring a coordinated effort in
electronics, computers and communications, its is surprising
how anything gets accomplished within the office of T.
3 . Credibi 1 i ty
G-T has had trouble in the past with its image from
the customer's viewpoint. Culbertson noted:
. . .the T-organizat ion is not perceived as being
responsive or effective in meeting the needs of program
and support managers. [Ref. 3: p 10]
Many people outside the T-organization have looked to G-T
for help in developing computer automation of office or
shipboard functions. As the requests for assistance in
developing these functions increased, G-T was slower in
accommodating the individual requests. This behavior
resulted in the perceived lack of responsiveness.
Other factors attributing to this perception are the
many small failures of automation projects attempted by G-T.
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The pure nature of the field of automation in the early
1980' s was the development of new untested concepts. As can
be expected, developing these new applications from scratch
required many years of effort and constant evolution. The
misunderstanding of this concept by users expecting the
capability to be developed quickly has contributed to the
perception of lack of credibility of G-T. [Ref. 3: p 11]
Many small projects which get started in G-T whether
computer or electronics fall by the wayside as priorities
change. The Critical Success Factor study held that the
lack of:
rigorous planning and priority setting within the office
has led to incomplete projects. [Ref. 4]
The priority problem will be taken up later; however, it is
safe to say that every project that fails to come to
fruition hurts G-T's credibility in the long run.
4. Overtasking
Overtasking is taking on so many projects, that it
is impossible to finish them all. A contributor to the
credibility problem, overtasking has its roots in two areas:
1) Prioritization of projects; and
2) The organization of G-T (addressed earlier).
The pressures put of T to get the Coast Guard up-to-
date with the latest in office automation or electronics
gear has made it difficult for individuals to say "no" to
taking on new projects. Because there is no priority
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setting mechanism to dist ingxiish important projects from
non-important ones, all projects seemed important. Project
managers were, therefore, unsure of what projects G-T
recognized as important. Consequently, project officers
became too bogged-down to finish any of their assigned
projects. Normally, where choices were made, project
managers preferred to work on their own "pet" projects
first
.
Overtasking was especially prevalent when funds
became available at the end of the fiscal year. In many
cases, poor planning led to extra work at the last moment to
avoid losing funds. The increase in pressure to spend money
quickly made it difficult to successfully complete projects
without a sufficient planning system in place.
Unfortunately, one has never been in place in the past.
5 . Planning and Guidance
Strategic planning in G-T has been found to be
almost non-existent. The lack of planning and top level
guidance in G-T were intertwined with many of the previously
mentioned problems and contributed to the overall break down
of effectiveness in the organization.
Although the Coast Guard planning system was
formally in place, it meant very little in the way business
was conducted in G-T. The Support Program Plan (SPP), for
instance, was supposed to be an office planning document to
describe and analyze the objectives, goals and activities of
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the T program. The document was developed at a low level in
the organization, based on the Commandant's Long-Range View
and sketchy Operating Program Plans (OPPs). Although it was
reviewed and signed by the G-T Board of Directors, the
document was shelved after fulfilling the "requirement" that
it be done annually.
More importantly, the SPP was not in a useful format
for G-T to use as a planning document. It was designed to
be a Chief of Staff document, used to derive and justify the
program's budget. Further, in developing the SPP, G-T used
very little input from the operating programs that it is
supposed to support. How much use is the SPP if little
planning effort is put into the document? Because the SPP
was not a functional planning document, the office of T
seems to have run its everyday operations without the luxury
of a long-range plan.
Planning in G-T is shortsighted with priorities in
the office seemingly changing from day to day. The Critical
Success Factor study states:
Planning, for the most part, has been focused in the very
near term, with most efforts involving more than six
month horizons not seen worthwhile given the volatile
environment. [Ref. 4]
G-T operates in a reaction mode using what little
information it has at the moment to make decisions. The
result is a confusing, constantly changing focus, making it
impossible to prioritize projects.
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Lack of guidance from top level managers has been
identified as contributing to the priority problem. A
common complaint heard during interviews was that top
managers weren't visible on a daily basis. Middle and low
level managers feel that the top level managers are so
involved in every day operations that it hinders their
ability to provide adequate vision about the future.
Without the vision from the top, planning is not productive.
C. SDMMARY
This chapter has cited some of the successes and
existing problems in the Office of Command, Control and
Communications. The data, accumulated during the interviews
and from recent studies, is the basis of the information
provided. Table 4.1 summarizes the problems and from what
sources they have been identified.
Next, a model used for analysis of strategic change
management will be presented. This will be followed by an
analysis of the G-T planning organization and processes.
The rest of the thesis will discuss the ways the G-T
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS MODEL
In light of future large-scale environmental changes,
the Coast Guard will be required to continually reorient
itself. It must ensure proper alignment of strategy,
structure, human resources and management processes to
solve the organization's technical, political and cultural
problems The key to the Coast Guard's success in this
endeavor is its strategic planning system. This chapter
discusses how the Coast Guard can assess the quality of its
planning system to ensure it provides the proper
reorientation focus.
Noel Tichy's model for strategic change management can
be used as a tool to assist managers in the reorientation
effort. The use of the Tichy model for the assessment of
the G-T planning system is based on the assumption that
organizations with sound strategic planning systems are
technically, politically and culturally aligned with their
environment. Tichy's model analyzes this alignment.
First, an explanation of how to use the model in
analyzing an organization's alignment will be presented.
Then, the analysis of G-T will follow, illustrating how
this model can be applied.
48
A. HOW TO DSE TICHY'S MODEL
The analysis of alignment of the technical, political
and cultural systems in organizations is a complex process.
However, Tichy's model, described in the Appendix, provides
a framework for a comprehensive study of an organization's
strategy, structure, human resources and management
processes
.
Figure 5.1 is the format used in summarizing the
analysis of alignments. A judgment is made for each cell of
the matrix regarding the amount of change needed to create
alignment. Working across the matrix, the alignment is
within a system: technical, political and cultural. Working
down the matrix alignment is between systems.
Points are assigned to each box in the matrix based on
the degree of change needed. A "0" indicates that no change
is needed, "1" indicates moderate change and "2" indicates a
great deal of change. Once judgments are made for each box
the number totals are summed up in both directions and
recorded in the margins.
The right margin indicates that amount of realignment
required within the technical, political or cultural system.
The bottom margin indicates the amount of change required by
the component parts of the organization.
The guidelines to be followed in making the assessment
























































The analysis should follow the description of the
model's components and systems in the Appendix. The
analysis should be carried out one system at a time
(technical, political, or cultural) and then across the
systems. This is accomplished by working, first across each
row, and then, down each column.
2 Guideline 2
The next step is to evaluate the degree of alignment
between the technical, political and cultural systems of the
organization
.
B. METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING ALIGNMENT WITHIN G-T
Tichy recommends that the analysis be carried out by a
committee of individuals that represents the key power
figures and groups most likely effected by the changes.
He, further, recommends that each individual in the groups
complete a private assessment of the analysis of alignments
before sharing it in committee. [Ref. 2: p 166]
In the analysis this procedure was not followed due to
the time and resource constraints on the study. The
analysis presented here is intended to be an illustration
of how G-T managers could use the Tichy model to analyze
their organizational alignments.
The analysis was performed by the author without
consultation with anyone in the G-T organization. The
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results are based solely on the data collected in the
interviews, information gathered from Coast Guard and G-T
documents, as well as studies conducted in G-T in the past
four years.
C. TBE ENVIRONMENT
Before performing the analysis of the model components,
the environmental factors should be discussed. This section
describes the technical, political and cultural systems in
the G-T environment.
1 . Technical System
There is no doubt that the electronics, computer and
telecommunication fields have undergone many major technical
revolutions in the past 25 years. Managing the explosion of
information in the Coast Guard's wide variety of mission
areas is impossible using manual Command, Control and
3Communications (C ) systems. The Coast Guard's dedicated
3move towards automated C systems began in 1980 with the
creation of the Office of T. Since that time a new
generation of computer, the personal computer and several
generations of software have become available for use by the
service.
High demand for computer services and upgrade in
communications equipment from analog to digital have
challenged the T-community to be extremely up-to-date on the
latest technological changes.
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Further, the nature of Command, Control and
Communications has changed dramatically as DOD and other
agencies with which the Coast Guard works wage their own
wars on technological obsolescence. Interoperability has
become the watch word of the 80s in C^
m Yet, with its
myriad of sensors and decision support systems, the Coast
Guard struggles within itself to integrate these stand-
alone, single-missioned systems. Pressure from outside
sources to integrate these systems has further complicated
the technological equation.
2. Political System
G-T operates in an environment which is by
definition political in nature. The Coast Guard, in
general, is a service oriented organization, funded by
Congress and managed by a dedicated group of professional
individuals, catering to the needs of multiple
constituencies. With this in mind, the political future of
the Coast Guard looks very uncertain and ambiguous indeed.
Other environmental factors exist which make it
difficult to adapt to the uncertainties in the environment
are: [Ref. 13]
1) Assigned personnel, military and civilian, limit
manager's ability to change or improve the quality of
personnel assigned to G-T billets.
2) Existing structure and resource allocations are
legislated and are difficult to alter. Where change
is allowed, the manager is unusually limited in scope
of change.
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3) The legislative system forces planning in G-T and the
Coast Guard to center around the annual budget. This
process is subject to multiple internal and external
influences resulting in uncertainty in budget
allocation from year to year. Because of this, long-
term planning is difficult due to the lack of long-
term funding.
4) Policies change with change in Presidential
administrations and Congressional leadership.
Programs advocated by one elected official may be cut
by the next one that assumes the office. The length
of term elected officials can force short range
planning and execution of programs to show short term
results in time for re-election. This factor
supports the official's agenda, but may not be in the
best interest of the program manager in the service.
The G-T organization, being military and
bureaucratic in nature, is politically mechanistic and is
slow to adapt to politically uncertain environments. The
poor match between G-T and its environment is detrimental to
the organization's effectiveness.
3 . Cultural System
G-T is made up of three different technical fields
of expertise. These technical specialities make up one
aspect of the culture of G-T.
Electronics Engineers are the most technical
oriented of the group. They are hardware driven, leaving
the application of their technology to others. They,
generally, prefer to work in hard facts and disregard the
management implications of their technological
breakthroughs
.
Computer technicians are the next most technical
group. Although they are becoming increasingly user aware,
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they have a tendency to become too involved in the
efficiencies of their computer systems, disregarding the
effectiveness concerns.
Communication specialists or communicators are
managers of the telecommunications systems in the Coast
Guard. They are the most management oriented of the group
and depend heavily on the support of the electronics
engineers and computer technicians.
Another aspect of the G-T culture is its operational
orientation. G-T operates within the overall cultural
environment of the Coast Guard. Officers that specialize in
the T field often rotate into non-T specialities every other
tour. This is done purposely to cultivate the "blue suit"
qualities of T officers. This exposure to the general duty
Coast Guard imparts many of the Coast Guard's norms and
roles on these officers.
A "blue suiter" is operations oriented, having been
assigned to billets, normally, as CO or XO onboard ships or
operational shore units. Similar to the Navy's "warfare
speciality" billets, these operational tours are seen as
essential to the experience of every general duty Coast
Guard Officer. This requirement is further enforced by the
promotion boards in that those without "blue suit"
experience usually don't get promoted.
Besides the operational orientation of most senior
officers, there are other norms in the Coast Guard which
55
attribute to the characteristics of Coast Guard managers.
For instance, look at the Coast Guard's motto "Semper
Paratus" meaning Forever Ready. The motto itself encourages
short range thinking. Unit commanders are taught to be
ready to get underway immediately to respond to any
emergency. This in itself fosters planning for today or
tomorrow and not to worry about next year or the year after
that. This short-term view of the world is taken from the
field to staff jobs where longer range views of issues are
needed.
The concept of independent operation of Coast Guard
units helps perpetuate the idea of ownership of "turf" in G-
T divisions. Because most Coast Guard units are independent
units and are not required to work in groups with other
units, sharing resources, the concept of cooperation is not
learned or reinforced in Coast Guard managers. This
"independent steamer" norm is then carried back to
headquarters where lack of communications and cooperation
abound.
Not all the cultural characteristics of the
organization are negative. Coast Guard Officers have an
ability to operate in extremely volatile and uncertain
environments. Crisis management is a very useful tool,
especially in Washington D.C. The need to be flexible and
react to a constantly changing environment is essential for
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success in uncertain technological and political
environments
.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL
Given the environment as described and the organization
as discussed in earlier chapters, this section analyzes G-T
by model component. The analysis draws heavily on the
background and facts presented in the earlier chapters.
1 . Miss ion /Strategy
The constantly changing technological environment
requires a strategy of constantly assessing the
environmental opportunities and threats, the organizational
strengths and weaknesses, defining the mission and
reallocating resources. G-T does not have a formal system
set-up for scanning the outside environment, however, it
does perform the other assessments rather well.
For instance, the mission of G-T is:
To enhance the effectiveness of Coast Guard mission
performance by acquiring and managing information,
telecommunications and electronics resources. [Ref. 14:
P 2]
The mission statement is flexible and easily adaptable to
changes in the internal and external environment.
Likewise, the Board of Directors, which meets on a
regular basis, constantly looks at the organizational
strengths and weaknesses and reallocates resources according
to the perceived need of the service.
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For the most part, the Board of Directors has the
major influence in the mission and strategy of the
organization. Coalitions, however, are represented by the
division officers, who are generally products of their area
of expertise. Managing change in G-T is subject to the
normal resistance experienced in any organization.
A major weakness of the organization is that mission
objectives are not articulated by top management. The
development of a culture aligned to the mission and strategy
cannot occur without all members of G-T knowing the
direction of the organization.
2. Tasks
Tasks include environmental scanning activities and
strategic planning activities.
Environmental scanning activities in G-T consist of
work at the Electronics Engineering Lab and Center. These
facilities search for new and emerging technologies and
research their application in the Coast Guard. Economic
evaluation of these technologies occur at G-T only when a
use for these technologies is found.
It was noted earlier that G-T has no formal
strategic planning system in effect. Without an understood
strategic plan, priorities cannot be set effectively and
projects in the organization are mismanaged. The constructs
for proper strategic planning, however, are in place. For
whatever reason, G-T does not make effective use of them.
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The problem of lack of priority setting mechanisms
was identified as detrimental to the technical effectiveness
of the office. Care must be taken to make sure that the
needs of the different technical coalitions in G-T are kept
involved if and when any kind of prioritizing process that
is developed.
Early in the history of G-T the organization had not
developed its own culture. It was made up of the separate
cultures that the divisions brought with them from the other
offices. Now, however, the organization is gaining its own
culture, norms and roles models.
Even so, top management needs to do more to
perpetuate this culture. Strong leadership is essential in
clarifying and further defining the values of the
organization. Without top level managers imparting their
philosophy on subordinates, the T culture cannot grow.
3 . Prescribed Networks
The structure of G-T is along product lines. With
the exception of G-TPP, all other divisions are organized to
take the best advantage of the G-T strategy. The weakness
in this organization is the lack of integrating mechanisms.
The newly formed DDCC and Planning councils are designed to
perform this function, however, the data on their
effectiveness in G-T was not available.
G-TPP is not in a position to perform the
integrating or planning functions in the most efficient
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manner. It has been difficult for G-TPP to accomplish these
assigned staff functions at the division level.
Presently, the power distribution is balanced across
all divisions. When G-TPP had the functional
responsibilities of resource and project allocation, the
balance of power was in G-TPP' s favor. However, with the
reallocation of divisional responsibilities in the 1986
reorganization, this imbalance was remedied.
An argument can be made that this structure and
power distribution makes G-TPP ' s human resource and
budgeting planning functions less effective. These are
staff functions which transcend all divisions and levels of
the organization. However, moving G-TPP into a staff
position may create an imbalance of power with respect to
the divisions. Design of the responsibilities and
authorities of G-TPP' s new position in the organization must
be done with power conflicts in mind.
The "independent steaming" culture of many Coast
Guard officers gets in the way of cooperation and
communication. This characteristic of Coast Guard managers
fosters over-protection of turf.
Management style in headquarters must be aligned
with the technical and political structure of the
organization. A trend of these structures, from the
separate divisional units to one integrated organization,
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requires that much attention be paid to the development of a
cooperative managerial culture in headquarters.
The existence of the various subcultures discussed
above requires integration mechanisms to create the overall
organizational culture of working together. This is
presently being accomplished through the assignment process.
Personnel with a computer specialty, for instance, can be
assigned to a communications billet, if necessary. The
Human Resources Branch should continue this practice to help
eliminate the sharp lines of distinction between the three
areas of technical specialty.
4. People
G-T has very little problem obtaining skilled
technical people to carry out the mission. Its managers are
compatible in style with the technical tasks.
Matching political skills of individuals with the
political needs of the organization is difficult in the
military. The tour length and rank structure places
constraints on the flexibility of G-T managers to place
individuals with particular skills where they want them in
the organization. This area of concern is beyond control of
G-T change agents.
Again, the leadership of the T organization must
articulate the corporate culture to all members of T. A
problem identified earlier was the lack of proper management
training given officers at headquarters. G-T must continue
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to pursue the education of its officers, not only in the
technical areas, but in the management areas as well.
5. Process
G-T has been slow in the past in adapting the office
information and planning systems to support the strategy and
tasks. However, the constant reevaluation of the
organization shows a willingness of the G-T leadership to
align process with its environment.
Lack of a priority setting mechanism has been
identified as having a detrimental effect on getting
projects completed at G-T. A change in this area is
essential
.
Performance measuring criteria for the services G-T
provides are slow in developing also. It is very hard to
quantify the types of services the organization provides to
the Coast Guard, but efforts are underway to accomplish
this
.
The reward system in the Coast Guard is standard
throughout the service and constrained by law. The
promotion system is fairly rigid, providing managers almost
no mechanism to immediately reward individuals who perform
exceptionally. The only way a manager can affect a
promotion of an individual is through use of the performance
evaluation system. These reports are used by promotion
boards in making decisions to promote individuals to the
next rank when their time comes up to be evaluated.
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Further, they are used by the assignment officers for making
assignments to rotational tours. The performance evaluation
system, however, results in long-term benefits for the
office, not immediate results.
Managing the politics of appraisal is not a problem
since a single manager's appraisal of an individual does not
carry much weight with the promotion board.
Managing the politics of information flow is a
consideration that top managers should concern themselves
with in formulating a planning system. No one division has
all the information, however, it is important that they all
participate in the planning process so that strategic
decisions can made be with adequate information.
Process in the cultural system consists of selecting
people with the skills to build and solidify the culture and
developing a reward system that reinforces the culture.
The T field has had problems in the past getting
personnel willing to pursue careers in the T field.
However, there is evidence that this trend is changing.
Tremendous gains have been made in career development and
retention through the planning efforts of the Human
Resources Branch and the efforts of the latest office chief.
The T organization is gaining a reputation of being a
professional, career enhancing subspecialty.
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6 . Emergent Networks
G-T exists in a military environment, characterized
by formal chains of command and rank structures. Although
some emergent networks evolve, they, for the most part, are
healthy, assisting in the effectiveness of members in the
networks
.
However, mismanaging the politics of emergent
networks can affect the effectiveness of organizations of
this size. Management of the different coalitions must be
in forefront of the organizational designer's mind and G-T
is no exception.
Throughout the Coast Guard friendships and
effective cultural networks exist service-wide. The size of
the Coast Guard and the T organization make it easy to
cultivate the family atmosphere. This atmosphere should
continue and will help to reinforce the corporate culture of
cooperation that the T organization needs to be effective.
D. ALIGNMENT OF THE THREE SYSTEMS
The increase in technical uncertainty in recent years
has promoted changes in the need to increase information-
processing capability. G-T must increase it ability to scan
the environment and create integrating mechanisms to
3
accommodate the task interdependence of today's C
environment. This will involve changes in organizational
structures and processes.
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These changes in the technical system must be
accomplished, keeping mind the political and cultural
changes that may obstruct the change effort. G-T leaders
must evaluate the organization's ability to manage the power
to allocate resources and decide on goals in an uncertain
environment. This becomes extremely difficult in
bureaucratic organizations and requires a change from the
politically mechanistic organization of the military to a
more politically organic one. Keeping in mind the
limitations on managers to change the organization
radically, G-T can move towards setting up informal
integrating mechanisms to deal with the political
uncertainty
.
Culturally, the top leadership should articulate more
the direction of the organization. The values to be shared,
the objectives worth striving for and the beliefs the
employees of G-T should be committed to are all part of the
culture that must be communicated. Cultural congruence and
consistency is essential given the environment.
E. SUMMARY OP RESULTS
Table 5.2 summarizes the results of the analysis of G-T.
Note that the areas diagnosed as needing the most change are
in the following organizational components:
1) Mission/strategy in the political system. Influence
in the formulation of strategy must lie with all
members of the organization. Further, better control
must be maintained over the behavior of the different
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2) Tasks in the technical and political systems.
Outside environmental scanning activities must be
improved. Strategic planning activities in G-T are
virtually non-existent and need further development.
Moreover, the organization must be able to lobby and
influence outside external constituencies to be
successful in carrying out its plans. Internal
coalition management must be improved as well to
eliminate in-fighting.
3) Prescribed networks in the cultural system. The
management style of top managers in G-T are not
aligned with the technical and political structure.
Integration of the different coalitions and sub-
cultures in the organization is essential for
managers to maintain alignment with the environment.
4) Process in the political system. Administration of
the reward system needs to be improved to reinforce
desired behaviors. The politics of information
control and the planning and priority setting
processes must also be managed better.
The areas needing no change at all were in the
organizational components of people and emergent networks.
It is felt by the author that these are two areas that
military managers have little influence over. Military
managers have been conditioned to do the best with the
skills of the personnel they are given and they do a fairly
good job at utilizing these skills.
What do these results mean with regard to the strategic
planning system in G-T? Given the premise that an
organization that is well aligned with its environment has a
good planning system, the results indicate that G-T needs to
make some improvements in its strategic planning system.
The components of the organization that require major
changes are indicated above. This analysis illustrates how
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G-T managers can pinpoint where to concentrate their change
efforts. The following chapter uses this analysis to
formulate recommendations for improvements to the strategic
planning system in the office.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
The analysis in the previous chapter highlights
weaknesses in the G-T management and planning systems that
inhibit the organization's ability to reorient its strategic
posture. This chapter recommends changes in the management
and planning systems which might improve the existing
planning system in G-T.
The recommendations are based on the analysis presented
in Chapter V and are the author's solutions to the problems
indicated.
A. COUNCILS
G-T should establish mechanisms for and encourage the
practice of cross-divisional cooperation and planning
through the use of integrating committees or councils.
Chapter II discussed the three councils already in place in
the G-T organization. The councils (refer to Figure 2.7)
were formed as a result of recommendations provided to G-T
in the Critical Success Factor study. The councils will
help eliminate problems in many of the areas previously
discussed
.
First, the council mechanism makes the organization more
politically organic by increasing G-T's bargaining capacity.
In a politically uncertain environment, this is important.
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The councils accomplish this by providing a mechanism for
the three product-line divisions to get together to discuss
problems and bargain for project resources.
The council structure encourages communication between
divisions, thus increasing the information processing
capabilities of G-T. The councils have been formed to
specifically combat this problem. By providing a mechanism
to channel information flows between divisions, uncertainty
about what is going on in the organization is reduced. The
cross-talk will be useful in increasing the environmental
scanning capabilities of the organization. The diversity of
technical expertise in the divisions is useful in processing
information about future technologies, future service needs
and future management trends. These can be discussed,
processed and disseminated easier through the use of the
counci 1 s
.
The councils also encourage cooperation between
divisions. The information channels open the door for
resource sharing between divisions. The problem of two
divisions working on the same project will likely occur
less, as long as the information channels are truly open.
Another problem that the councils address is the lack of
a priority setting mechanism. It will be easier to
formulate priorities through this integrated approach.
Although priority setting must ultimately come from the top,
the councils can provide meaningful, integrated guidance to
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help G-T arrive at priorities the entire organization can
understand and live with.
Finally, the councils helps to cultivate a G-T corporate
culture. The integrating mechanism brings together the
three sub-cultures of electronics, computers and
communications. Cultural values can be discussed freely and
constructively. Organizational norms and roles can be
learned and passed laterally throughout the organization.
The entire organization will, therefore. develop a
homogeneous cultural identity which makes translates into
higher productivity and better organizational effectiveness.
B. NEW PLANNING SYSTEM
A functional link between the strategic planning system
and the programming and budgeting process needs to be
established. Chapter III discussed the Chief of Staff's
efforts to overhaul the Coast Guard Headquarters planning
system. G-T should use this opportunity to discard the poor
planning emphasis it had in the past and develop new
planning procedures in the office. Figure 6.1 shows how
this can be accomplished.
Through the Planning Council, divisional needs can be
integrated and coordinated. Although closer ties with the
Operating Programs are needed, the planning council can
provide a wealth of resources and experience to make
strategic planning useful.
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Information from the field, Operating Programs and the





















Figure 6.1: The Proposed Planning Process
level and passed up to the DDCC. The DDCC can then review
the planning document, interjecting their special needs and
expertise
.
Finally, the document is passed to the Board of
Directors. Here strategic planning decisions should be made
using all the information passed up through the chain-of-
command and the councils. Coupled with the BOD's top level
view of the organization, a first rate strategic plan and
planning document can be developed.
The key to the success of the planning system, however,
is its use in the programming and budgeting system. The
Chief of Staff has committed to using the Program
Description, each offices strategic planning document, as
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the basis for issues and the budget. This will help force
G-T to develop the Program Description into as a useful
office plan, using it throughout the budget process.
A side benefit is that everyone in the organization will
know the direction G-T is headed making priority setting
more certain.
C. KEEP G-TPP WHERE TT IS
Although G-TPP should logically reside as an office
staff, there is too much resistance from all levels of the
organization for the move. The political and power issues
cannot be overcome at this point in time.
Instead, G-TPP should be used to facilitate the
strategic planning process described above. Sitting on the
councils and providing clerical support, the division can be
useful in developing the written documents and executing the
plans. G-TPP, however, should not be the only player in
strategic planning.
G-TPP' s allocation of resources and budgeting functions
should be closely supervised and supported by the office
chief. The G-TPP Division Chief should also have the
seniority to settle disputes between other division chiefs.
A senior Coast Guard Captain (0-6) should be assigned to the
job
.
Human Resource Planning is a key office function that
has received much attention and support in recent years.
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The present structure seems to be working in this regard.
However, top management must not become content with the
successes of late. The T organization continues to grow and
needs to attract more personnel resources. By strengthening
the T career sub-specialty, through increasing the
promotabi 1 ity of officers and assignment to career enhancing
jobs, top management can ensure a steady growth in the T
field.
D. INCREASE TOP MANAGEMENT'S VISIBILITY
Top management needs to be more visible and accessible
to lower levels of the organization. This management
technique can help top managers keep in touch with what's
going on in the office, first hand. It can also help them
cultivate the preferred culture by spreading their
philosophy directly to organizational members. This shows
subordinates that top management is interested and involved
in what they are doing.
Common complaints in the interviews were that top
management was never seen around the office. They were
viewed as being so busy attending to the details of everyday
operations that they didn't have the big picture. However,
in actuality, top managers had the big picture. This can be
attributed to the manager's position and experience in the
organization. The perception of their inattentiveness
,
however, was very real in the minds of lower level managers.
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As a result of this perception, overall organizational
effectiveness was not being optimized.
Top managers need to employ a technique of "management
by walking around" (referred to as MBWA ) [Ref. 15]. A
principle advocated by Tom Peters, this simple and obvious
technique can do wonders for organizational effectiveness.
Unfortunately, this simple and obvious technique is
neglected in the Coast Guard. Reasons for this vary from
the hierarchical culture of the military to the simplicity
of the technique.
MBWA can help G-T managers keep in touch with their
environment by familiarizing them with what problems exist
in the office and in the field. MBWA also provides a means
by which the cultural values and norms of the organization
can be spread. Coming directly from top management's
example, the culture is more visible, and therefore, can be
adopted by the rest of the organization more readily.
Finally, MBWA shows that top management is interested in
everything the organization does. It sends the message that
everyone is important. Even the smallest function, done
well, improves the overall effectiveness of the
organization
.
The effectiveness of the MBWA technique has been proven
time and again in companies like Federal Express and the
Louisville Redbirds Minor League baseball team [Ref. 15].
It's time the Coast Guard employed it.
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E. REWARDS
Rewards should be given to reinforce desired behavior.
For example, recognizing people who practice and encourage
cooperation or planning when managing projects can reinforce
these types of behavior. Too often the organization
recognizes undesirable behavior, using it as an example of
what not to do
.
The recognition can come through meetings of all G-T
personnel or write-ups in the weekly T Staff Notes. This
can go a long way towards letting people know what top
managers perceive as beneficial to the effectiveness of the
organization
.
Better use of the performance evaluation reports can
also help reinforce desired behavior. Creative ways of
writing up accomplishments that exhibit good long-range
planning or cooperative efforts between division must be
found and used in evaluating performance.
Likewise, the assignment process can provided needed
rewards for outstanding performance. Because the Human
Resources Branch has a strong influence in the assignment
process, it can be used a a vehicle for rewarding these
behaviors. Career enhancing and desirable jobs can be
awarded to good performers.
However, care must be taken to maintain the technical
and managerial competency of the T organization. Desirable
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jobs, for instance, must not be assigned as rewards to top
performers if the jobs are training grounds for T
specialists who need the experience.
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VTT. CONCLDSIONS
The study researched the possibility of improving Coast
Guard planning. Because of the time and resource
constraints, the Office of Command, Control and
Communications (G-T) was chosen as a representative unit of
the Coast Guard to serve as a sample to study the planning
system. It was felt that G-T with its volatile environment
would be an excellent of how the Coast Guard would be
required to plan in the future.
It was dicovered that G-T had real problems with its
planning system. The organization was slow to react to the
changes in its environment and did not possess either the
structure or management processes to adequately perform
strategic planning.
Noel Tichy's model was demonstrated to be a useful tool
in identifying the organizational components in G-T on
which managers should concentrate their change efforts.
The Tichy model provides guidance to changes in the
planning system to ensure the alignment of organizational
components and the technical, political and cultural
systems with the environment.
It is important to recognize that other models can be
used to identify an organization's planning weaknesses.
Managers should be aware that the use of a model such as
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Tichy's model helps guide them through the complex analysis
process. Without the models, the analysis would most
likely be incomplete.
Recommendations for improvement of the G-T planning
system were:
1) Establish management councils to provide the
integrating mechanism needed for strategic planning.
2) Promote a new planning system that links strategic
planning with operational plans.
3) Maintain the present formal structure in G-T, but
emphasize cooperation and communication between
divisions
.
4) Employ "Management By Walking Around" techniques by
the top office managers to give them more exposure to
their environment.
5) Use the reward system to reinforce desired behaviors.
This may require some innovative techniques because
the formal reward system is too rigid and controlled.
The author believes that these changes will emphasize the
importance strategic planning in G-T.
The results of the study in G-T can probably be applied
to other areas of the Coast Guard. It is safe to say that
the Coast Guard as a whole has a problem with strategic
planning given the technical, political and cultural
systems used to manage its programs. The techniques used
in the study to identify weaknesses in G-T's planning
system can reasonably be applied to any other organization
within the service.
It is not unusual for organizations to have trouble
with strategic planning. The present day environment is
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turbulent and the future environment looks to be even more
complex. The Coast Guard has had some remarkable successes
in the past two hundred years and will most likely have
many more. The employment of a strategic planning system
that enables the organization to move forward would
facilitate more successes and help to reduce the problems.
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APPENDIX; TICHY' S MODEL FOR STRATEGIC CHANGE MANAGEMENT
Tichy views organizations as social networks. They are
composed of people and groups that join together in a
variety of relationships. Many of these groups are not
joined directly while other have multiple relationships.
The perception he is concerned with is how these
relationships are patterned and the causes and consequences
of these relationships.
Tichy' s social network organizational model aims to:
1) Integrate technical, political and cultural
organizations
.
2) Point to pragmatic diagnostic questions.
3) Help formulate specific change strategies for use in
the technical, political and cultural areas.
The model analyzes three systems in the organization:
the technical, political and cultural system. The analysis
of information networks—who exchanges information with
whom—provides the concepts and tools for technical
analysis. Analysis of influence networks— seeing who
influences whom about what—provides the concepts and tools
for political analysis. Finally, the analysis of the
friendship relationships provides insight into the way
values and norms of a culture are disseminated and
reinforced. [Ref. 2: pp 71-73]
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A. COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL
The components Tichy's of the network model are shown in
Figure A.l. They are used to guide the strategic management
change process. The model is based on the assumption that
organizational effectiveness (indicated here as Output) is a
function of the characteristics of each of the components of
the model, as well as a function of how the components
interrelate and align themselves into a functioning system.
This section will examine each component of Tichy's model.
[Ref. 2: pp 74-94]
1. Inputs
Inputs are the background factors out of which an
organization arises and in which it operates. These factors
are the organization's history, environment and resources.
The history of an organization and how it came to be
is useful in understanding how the organization works.
Organizations are often prisoners of their own histories.
Therefore, history can uncover some interesting material
which explains how things are today and may be in the
future.
Every organization is embedded in an environment
that provides opportunities and constraints. The
environment has a large impact on the performance of the
organization. Reducing the uncertainty of the environment






















the organization's reason for being,
its basic approach to carrying out
its mission, its strategy, and its
criteria for effectiveness.
Tasks: This refers to the technology
by which the organization's work is
accomplished.
People: This includes the characteris-
tics of the members of the organization
including background, motivational
patterns, managerial style.
Formal Organization: This refers to
the explicitly designed social struc-
ture of the organization. It includes
the organization of subunits, communica-
tion and authority networks, as well as
structural mechanisms for integrating the
organization.
Organizational Processes: These are the
mechanisms (communication, decision
making, conflict management, control, and
reward) which enable the formal organiza-
tion to carry out the dynamics of work.
Emergent Networks: These are the
structures and processes which, although
not planned or formally prescribed,
inevitably emerge in the organization.
Figure A.l: Tichy's Organizational Model
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maximize their performance. Components of the environment
are the industry, political climate, social expectations,
economic climate inside and outside the organization, as
well as the expectations of employees in the organization.
Resources are the third category of organizational
input. Resources include the organization's capital,
technological capabilities, people, including the skills
they possess, reputation and goodwill.
2. Mission/Strategy
Mission is the organization's reason for being. It
is determined by top managers to meet the needs of its
stakeholders. Large organizations may have many missions
due to the multiple coalitions or stakeholders that exist.
Strategy is the organizations ' s basic approach to
carrying out the mission. It includes a set of guidelines,
which determine the organization's future objectives.
Strategy is often neither explicit nor agreed upon by
organizational members.
3. Tasks
Tasks are specific activities which the organization
must perform in order to carry out its mission and strategy.
Tasks differ greatly from organization to organization.
They depend on the amount of interaction required between
people, variety of activities, routineness of tasks and
breadth of skills involved in the task.
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4. Prescribed Networks
Prescribed Networks refer to the definition of jobs
and the expected interrelationships among jobs. They define
the structure of the organization and are, typically,
represented by organization charts. The organization of
communications and authority networks, as well as structural





People of the organization can be characterized by
the following:
1) The skills and interests individual members of the
organization have.
2) Individual members' styles of learning.
3) The values and assumptions individual members hold,
especially their expectations about leadership.
4) Individual members' preferences for variety,
definition and structure, and individual challenge.
In short, the individuals' motivation.
6 Process
For people to carry out their prescribed tasks in
organizations there must exist dynamic processes of
communications, control, problem solving, reward and
conflict management.
Communications is the central process that makes the
organization work. Because organizations are information-
processing mechanisms, information is the glue by which the
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organizations is held together. Communications networks
transport all types of social task oriented information.
Control processes are the tools for observing and
providing information to make the necessary adjustments when
problems arise. These processes exist in two types: one
aimed at catching errors and the other aimed at collecting
problem-solving information.
Reward system processes are crucial to driving the
organizations towards change. They are what motivates
individuals toward new goals. These are important tools for
strategic change management.
7. Emergent Networks
Organizations develop extensive informal or emergent
structures and processes as a result of human interaction.
These networks of relationships and processes emerge because
individuals tend to:
1) Formulate, re-formulate and interpret the mission.
2) Understand, abide by and/or change the prescribed
organization and processes.
3) Use, abuse and alter technology.
4) Respond to changing environmental conditions.
As a result, a new set of unplanned and often unanticipated
structures and processes emerges.
These emergent networks may either hinder or help
the accomplishment of the organizational mission.
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8. Output
Tichy looks at output as organizational
effectiveness. Effectiveness has three components:
1) Goal optimization—Evaluates the organization in
relationship to its intended behavior.
2) Systems perspective—Emphasizes the importance of
viewing the organizations as an open system with
interdependent parts. These parts must be in harmony
if effectiveness is to be achieved. The
organizations must exhibit alignment between the
technical, political and cultural systems.
3) Behavioral emphasis--Focuses on the interface between
the organization and its members. In other words
what impact does the organization have on its members
in terms of satisfaction, quality of working life and
growth opportunities.
B. INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MODEL COMPONENTS
The goal of Tichy' s change management is to align the
components of an organization technically, politically, and
culturally. Figure A. 2 shows what needs managing in this
change process. Tichy believes that if there is harmony
between these components and systems, the organizational
effectiveness will be optimized.
Because organizations are dynamic and exist in changing
environments none of the three systems are ever stable.
Achieving strategic alignment is the responsibility of the
leaders of the organization. Knowing when these systems are
aligned, however, is difficult.
The four strategic alignment tests Tichy advocates to
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Technical alignment strives to match organizational
designs to the complexity and uncertainty of environments
and the organization's technology. The following principle
applies:
An organization is technologically effective to the
degree that the uncertainty it faces matches its capacity
to process information and to eliminate the uncertainty.
[Ref. 2: p 126]
Uncertainty arises because information required to complete
tasks exceed the information processed. The sources of
uncertainty in organizations are: environment, tasks, and
task interdependencies
.
Two options are available to deal with uncertainty:
1) Reduce the uncertainty. This is accomplished only by
changing the organization's relation to its
environment; or
2) Change the tasks or task interdependencies. This
implies altering the organization's information-
processing capabilities.
Care must be taken when adjusting the technological system
because it may have detrimental effects on the political or
cultural systems.
2. Political Alignment
Political alignment is based on the view that
organizational behaviors are shaped by political bargaining
which will guide the allocation of organizational resources.
The political drive of an organization is for survival and
growth. Survival and growth depend on continuing exchanges
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between members of the organization of labor, money or
support. The more an organization depends on the
contributions of one individual or group, the more power
that individual or group exerts on the allocation process.
The objective of the political test of alignment is
to reduce or manage uncertainly. The focus is on the
uncertainty surrounding the power to allocate resources and
decide on the organization's goals. There two ways of
dealing with this uncertainty:
1) Alter the uncertainty. This entails changing the
political environment by forming political coalitions
to maintain control; or
2) Develop a consensus over goals and means. This
requires adjustments in the fit between political
bargaining needs and political bargaining processing
capacity
.
A political adjustment may also trigger technological or
cultural adjustments.
3. Cultural Alignment
Cultural alignment is harder to define, and
therefore, harder to identify. However, it is far too
important a part of every organization to ignore.
Cultural alignment or congruence is a product of two
conditions
:
1) A majority of the organizational members should
accept the beliefs, endorse the values, and abide by
the norms; and
2) Individual members should be made aware that the
beliefs, values and norms have collective support.
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Cultural congruence varies over time with the change in the
environment. Organizations must have ways to reduce
incongruence or have ways of managing incongruence. (An
analogy can be made between incongruence and uncertainty.)
Testing the cultural alignment of the organization
is done by analyzing amount of cultural uncertainty the
organizations faces and the managerial responses to the
cultural uncertainty. In general, as cultural incongruence
increases, the need for cultural adjustments increases.
There are two way of dealing with cultural
incongruence
:
1) Change the organization's relation to the environment
or change the diversity of the organization's people;
or
2) Alter the organizations ability to adjust to
incongruence
.
As with the other systems, changes in the cultural system
may trigger changes in the technical system or political
system.
4. Testing Consistency between the Three Systems
The basic task for change managers is to make sure
that the three systems not only are aligned from within, but
also between the systems. Organizations that constantly
attend to the technical issues, for instance, often give too
little attention to the political or cultural issues.
Most organizations have a dominant system. For
instance, religious organizations are dominated by cultural
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systems, political parties by political systems and
manufacturing firms by technical systems. A rule of thumb
is that the dominant system is usually in balance with the
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